It is my great pleasure to share with this paper that I will be analyzing some of the obstacles that surround phase two of combating the Al-Shabaab group by organizing the Somali government, which has said a variety of events in numerous places. Aside from phase two missions, these problems were also included during phase one missions. We'll look at it as a lesson learned while also figuring issues out.
True, after completing phase one of the operations, Somali President Hassan Sheik Mahmoud proclaimed that phase two of the fight against AS had begun, however, it had yet to commence due to numerous current problems. I'd like to utilize real-world examples to illustrate some of these issues.
Mismanagement at the state administration level.
Since the implementation of the federal system, Somalia has been divided into five states and a federal government. Each state has its administration and border, which are administered by the federal government.
As we all know, the Al-Shabaab group has had long-term control over significant large areas of land, making it difficult to remove them. Following Hassan Sheik Mohamed's announcement to combat the Al-Shabaab group, three ways were proposed, one of which was face-to-face fighting. The good news was that all members of the state of Somalia supported the liberation and were also fighting against this group; they went to the front lines to engage the soldiers and provide encouragement.
Furthermore, the president's states attempted to establish coordination between the state and federal governments to obtain help with matters like troops, military healthcare, and logistical support. Indeed, the government's national military and Somalia's international allies played an important role in the ongoing war. As a group stood alongside local community forces and state militaries on one side against the terrorist organization, however, there was doubt about political attention between some states and federal governments. This indicates that the consequences were not long-lasting because attention was not given and there were no defined war plans discussed and agreed upon at the state and federal levels before and throughout the liberation period.
A weak collaboration exists between the federal government and state-level administrations.
My assumption on this point is that during liberation, the government set out to lead the war-specific Ministry of Defense, while state members also desired to do so. After disagreeing with that, the federal government appeared to back away from it. During those days, people heard in the media about a boiling conflict between some state members and the federal government, which may lead to and hinder coordination between the federal government and state-level administrations toward emancipation.
Security analysts are concerned about this phase one mission with conflicts of personal or organizational interest that might contain money, the highest positions, and so on. However, the liberation was interrupted due to a lack of collaboration on both sides. That is why it should not surprise us if the Al-Shabaab can take back the land from which they fled long ago. Sure, this challenge takes many shapes, and resolving it is difficult since it may involve a distant political issue.
To prove this point, there was a huge battle in which Al-Shaab attacked national armies based in Coosweeyne. In that attack, the government lost a lot of armies, including commanders and special armies. I do not doubt that one of the main challenges was a lack of collaboration, although some people said that was a conspiracy, and that some members of the government provided arms information to the enemy that aimed to destroy the Somali National Armies, although in this case I have no proof.
War without strategy (before and after)
When President Hassan Mohamud took office for the next term, he declared that he would be fighting Against Al-Shabaab, which has a serious problem with humanity. By saying it that way.
Fortunately, the fight in the Hiran region began without prior planning by the community and the AS group. Finally, Al-Shabaab fled a big territory in the Hiran region. Following mouths, the government initiated a joint war and provided ammunition to local community troops, among other things. However, the battle continued without a strategy or war plan until it failed to reach what I pointed out previously.
Some Somali experts believe Hassan Shiek and his team were not prepared to combat the terrorist group from the start, but they were forced to join since they could not watch and close their eyes. What is going on in the Hiran region? That is why the government is unable to begin a fight against Al-Shabaab on its own; instead, it has been saying, "Next phase will start, and next phase will start," every day.
Conclusion and advice
The obstacles outlined above, as well as those not discussed in this article, are currently factors that require being handled in advance. So the government will be capable of moving forward with phase two of the Fighting Al-Shabaab group's operations. Therefore, I advise the government in the following areas:
v The government ought to mobilize the community by raising awareness and dropping the wrong ideological theory introduced by the terrorist group. I feel that this point will address many problems in society and foster a strong relationship between the community and the government.
v A bilateral initiative was developed by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Security, and it states that organizing and arranging local community forces (Macawiisley) to act as local police and Darawish, as well as providing register numbers and monthly salaries while they operate their stations and prevent citizens.
Farah Mohomed Hiran
Peace and Security Consultant.
E-mail: Frhlamaane@Gmail.com
+252615590921
Commentaires